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Abstract
Background: This paper has its origins in Jonathan Mann's insight that the experience of dignity
may explain the reciprocal relationships between health and human rights. It follows his call for a
taxonomy of dignity: "a coherent vocabulary and framework to characterize dignity."
Methods: Grounded theory procedures were use to analyze literature pertaining to dignity and
to conduct and analyze 64 semi-structured interviews with persons marginalized by their health or
social status, individuals who provide health or social services to these populations, and people
working in the field of health and human rights.
Results: The taxonomy presented identifies two main forms of dignity–human dignity and social
dignity–and describes several elements of these forms, including the social processes that violate
or promote them, the conditions under which such violations and promotions occur, the objects
of violation and promotion, and the consequences of dignity violation. Together, these forms and
elements point to a theory of dignity as a quality of individuals and collectives that is constituted
through interaction and interpretation and structured by conditions pertaining to actors,
relationships, settings, and the broader social order.
Conclusion: The taxonomy has several implications for work in health and human rights. It
suggests a map to possible points of intervention and provides a language in which to talk about
dignity.
Background
Dignity has long been prominent in the discourses of
both health and human rights. In health and healthcare,
dignity is featured in many professional practice codes, is
a key concept in fields like palliative and long-term care,
and also arises in discussions of healthcare service delivery
performance and reform [1-5]. Although somewhat con-
troversial in North America, dignity is central to the "new
bioethics" that has emerged in Europe over the last decade
[6-8]. Dignity and human rights are historically and con-
ceptually coupled in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights [9-11]. Actions taken to respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights promote dignity, while those that violate
human rights also violate dignity.
As signaled by its title, this paper has its origins in
Jonathan Mann's insight that dignity is not only funda-
mental to health and human rights separately, but may
actually serve to explain the link between the two: that is,
the relationships between the societal achievement, or
failure, of human rights goals and individual and collec-
tive health status may be mediated by the experience of
dignity [12]. The research upon which this paper is based
follows his call for work aimed at developing a taxonomy
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of dignity: "a coherent vocabulary and framework to char-
acterize dignity" and its violation [13]. Such a taxonomy
should describe and classify the forms of dignity, the ele-
ments that comprise these forms, and the relationships
among the elements, thus expanding understanding of
the concept and providing an empirical base from which
to develop strategies for enhancing human well-being.
Methods
Grounded theory is an interpretive research approach
with theoretical roots in symbolic interactionism and
methodological roots in Chicago School sociology
[14,15]. Its practitioners use qualitative methods like
interviews and participant observation to gather data,
which then are analyzed using the techniques of constant
comparison and dimensional analysis [15-17]. The goal
of a grounded theory analysis is to derive from the data
concepts, conceptual categories, and linkages between cat-
egories; the product is a theory of a phenomenon
grounded in the lived experience of research participants,
rather than an analysis that enlists existing theory to expli-
cate that experience. Unlike some other interpretive meth-
odologies, grounded theory focuses on variation and
elaborates complexity, seeking to show how social process
makes meaning and how contextual conditions structure
social process. These characteristics make grounded the-
ory an excellent methodology to use when investigating
concepts like dignity that are simultaneously extremely
abstract and strongly rooted in tangible aspects of social
life. In addition, because grounded theory "fosters [the
integration of] subjective experience with social condi-
tions," it is a valuable tool for social justice research [18].
The methods used for the work reported here were a
review and analysis of the literature pertaining to dignity
and a series of interviews with individuals for whom dig-
nity is important. The conduct and findings of the litera-
ture review have been described at length elsewhere [19].
The data for the analysis described in this paper were
drawn from the literature and from 64 interviews con-
ducted with individuals from one or more of three groups:
persons marginalized by their health or social status (e.g.,
people with mental health or addiction diagnoses, home-
less individuals); individuals who provide health or social
services to these populations (e.g., outreach workers,
clergy, healthcare providers); and people working in the
arena, broadly defined, of health and human rights (e.g.,
a street nurse and homeless advocate, a human rights law-
yer who specializes in women's reproductive health, a
founder of the World Dignity Forum). As is appropriate in
grounded theory, all sampling was purposeful. Marginal-
ized individuals were targeted because the extant dignity
literature suggested that such individuals are particularly
prone to dignity violation. Providers were sampled when
the analysis of early data suggested that their perspectives
would be important to the developing theory. Health and
human rights practitioners were recruited primarily to gar-
ner their insights about the political meanings and uses of
dignity; these interviews were somewhat less focused on
personal experience than were the others. Participants
were recruited by flyer and word of mouth (marginalized
individuals and service providers) and by invitation
(health and human rights practitioners). These methods
ensured the salience of the topic for the individuals who
agreed to participate. With several exceptions in the
groups of providers and health and human rights practi-
tioners, all interviews were conducted with people living
and working in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
The semi-structured interviews, which lasted between 45–
90 minutes, used open-ended questions to elicit individu-
als' detailed accounts of their own experiences of dignity
and their understandings of the meaning, impact, and
consequences of those experiences. The author and two
trained interviewers conducted all interviews; this group
met to debrief and discuss the interview questions and
responses as the project unfolded. All interviews were
audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. (The research
ethics board at the Centre for Addiction and Mental
Health in Toronto approved the interview protocol. Par-
ticipants, who were promised anonymity, provided
signed informed consent.) Analysis of the interview data
commenced after the first interview and included several
steps: coding of transcripts using a coding paradigm from
Schatzman's formulation of dimensional analysis, con-
stant comparison of concepts and conditions derived
from the data, development of higher order categories to
encompass and link these concepts and conditions, and
extensive memo writing to track and explore developing
ideas [16,17]. As the analysis proceeded, it shaped the
interview questions posed to participants (as well as the
decision of which participants to recruit), thus allowing a
check on the relevance and appropriateness of the inter-
pretation. In addition, at several points a précis of the
findings was presented to and feedback invited from indi-
viduals and groups who had either participated in or facil-
itated the research. Analytic work on the taxonomy
described here ended once there was a good fit between
the data and the categories that make up the taxonomy;
that is, the taxonomic elements account for all of the
grounded data.
Results
Forms of Dignity
A short history of dignity has three main episodes. In the
first, man has dignity because he has been made in the
image of God. This distinction marks the human species
as superior to the rest of creation [20-22]. In the second,
dignity resides in social hierarchy and is closely tied to a
system of rank. Dignity is both relative–nobles are moreBMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/3
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dignified than peasants–and absolute–bringing with it a
set of duties and privileges tied to office [23,24]. The third
episode introduces the Kantian conception of dignity as
grounded in the quality of rational agency–the ability of
individuals to make moral choices and thus to self-govern
[23,25-27]. Dignity is thus an attribute that pertains to
humanity as a collective entity, one that attaches only to
certain classes of persons, and a characteristic inherent in
all individuals.
Contemporary work on dignity, ongoing in disciplines as
diverse as theology, philosophy, law, political theory,
sociology, medicine, and nursing, is varied and rich,
marking dignity as a theoretical and practical concept of
enduring fascination. In addition to its foundational roles
in health and human rights, dignity also figures promi-
nently in constitutional law, in social justice, and in eth-
nographic accounts of the lives of poor and oppressed
people [28-35]. Despite, or perhaps because of, this ubiq-
uity, the idea of dignity has been criticized for being vague
and contradictory [36-38].
The review and analysis of the literature mentioned earlier
in this paper led to an understanding that dignity has two
complementary but distinct forms: human dignity and
social dignity [19]. Human dignity is the abstract, universal
quality of value that belongs to every human being simply
by virtue of being human. It is held by the species, by col-
lectives (groups or peoples), and by individuals. It admits
of no quantity and cannot be created or destroyed. Social
dignity is generated in the interactions between and
amongst individuals, collectives, and societies. It may be
divided into two types: dignity-of-self and dignity-in-rela-
tion. Dignity-of-self is a quality of self-respect and self-
worth that is identified with characteristics like confi-
dence and integrity and a demeanor described as digni-
fied. Dignity-in-relation refers to the ways in which
respect and worth are conveyed through individual and
collective behavior. It also encompasses the historical
sense of dignity as adhering to status or rank. Expectations
for what dignity should be and perceptions of when it is
present or absent depend upon the mores and traditions
of a particular community or society. Because they are
socially produced, both types of social dignity are also
contingent: they can be measured, violated, or promoted.
Although participants in the interview portions of this
study were not asked to define dignity, in speaking of their
experiences they often explored their own understandings
of its meaning. Their definitions-in-use closely mapped
onto the concepts of human and social dignity discerned
in the literature. For example, participants described the
concept here called human dignity: "dignity is not a com-
modity...it is inherent in everyone...every person has to be
valued being a person"; "it's just something that should be
there regardless of who you are or where you are, you
know." Dignity-of-self was reflected in remarks like: "dig-
nity is the positive feelings that I have for myself";
"respect, self-esteem, sense of self, self-worth...trust, valu-
ing self, honoring yourself"; "you've got your self-respect,
you've got your values, you've got your dignity." And the
concept of dignity-in-relation was expressed in comments
like: "it's just the way I'm treated and spoken to"; "dignity
isn't just how you're treated but also how you treat oth-
ers"; "respect by others of your own, um, space and your,
of who you are"; and "socialism is dignity."
Participants talked about human and social dignity in
ways that begin to explain how the two forms of dignity
might be related. One participant described dignity-of-self
as vulnerable to damage–" [people's dignity is] there, but
they may not...they may have been shot down so much
that they don't believe that" – but human dignity as
enduring – "it's there for everybody, it's just how you
access it." A second spoke about human dignity as some-
thing that "everybody has inside of them" and social dig-
nity as actions aimed at " [cultivating] the idea of it." Two
participants' definitions of dignity, "to be recognized for
my real worth as a human being" and "honoring the
humanness of the other, or attempting to do that
and...being respectful or treating everybody with fairness,
and that's what dignity is about," suggested that social dig-
nity (recognition, respect and fair treatment) are
responses to or acknowledgments of human dignity
(worth as a human being, humanness).
Elements of Dignity
Dignity Encounters
Every human interaction holds the potential to be a dig-
nity encounter–an interaction in which dignity comes to
the fore and may be either violated or promoted. Such
encounters involve individuals or collectives, actors
whose intercourse is composed of layers of markers, ges-
tures, interpretations, and responses. Dignity encounters
take place in specific settings, public or private social and
physical environments in which actors engage in certain
customary patterns of behavior. For example, dignity
encounters described by the interview participants
unfolded in places like healthcare facilities, family homes,
welfare offices, jails, classrooms, coffee shops, and urban
sidewalks. These settings, like the actors and their encoun-
ters, are embedded in a broader social order. The dignity
dimension of an interaction is related to several sets of
conditions: the positions of the individual or collective
actors; characteristics of the relationship between the
actors; features of the setting; and properties of the
broader social order in which the setting, actors, and
encounter are all situated. Figure 1 is a representation of
these conditions.BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/3
Page 4 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
Dignity encounters appear more likely to result in viola-
tion when one actor is in a position of vulnerability–for
example, when the actor is sick, poor, weak, helpless,
ashamed, or confused–and the other actor is in a position
of antipathy–for example, the actor is prejudiced, arrogant,
hostile, or impatient. Violation is more common when
the relationship between the actors is one of asymmetry;
that is, when one actor has more power, authority, knowl-
edge, wealth, or strength than the other. Settings charac-
terized by harsh circumstances are also more likely to see
violation of dignity. Such settings are often described as
hierarchical and rigid, full of distraction and stress and
urgency, but lacking in resources. Dignity violation is tied
to an order of inequality, a social order in which inequities
like those based in racism or sexism or economic disparity
flourish. Dignity violation is portrayed graphically in Fig-
ure 2.
By contrast, dignity promotion becomes more likely when
one actor in an encounter is in a position of confidence–has
a sense of self-assurance and hope and feels deserving of
good things–and the other in a position of compassion–is
kind, open-minded, honest, and has good intentions.
Encounters are more likely to result in dignity promotion
when the relationship between the actors is one of solidar-
ity; that is, when the relationship is characterized by qual-
ities like reciprocity, rapport, empathy, and trust. Dignity
promoting settings are those that feature humane circum-
stances–characteristics like accessibility, transparency,
friendliness, beauty, and calm. Finally, dignity promotion
is more likely to occur under an order of justice, a social
order that sees the provision of adequate income and
housing, access to education and healthcare, and other
societal investment in public goods. Dignity promotion is
portrayed graphically in Figure 3.
Participants' accounts suggested these are the ideal condi-
tions for violation and promotion, but that in actuality
their dignity encounters often take place in mixed condi-
tions. That is, one may find settings meeting the descrip-
tion of humane circumstances even under broader orders
of inequality or relationships characterized by solidarity
even when one actor is in a position of vulnerability.
Thus, neither dignity violation nor dignity promotion
requires the simultaneous presence of all of the condi-
tions described. Conditions at one level can influence
conditions at other levels, however. In an order of ine-
quality, the relationship between actors in a given dignity
encounter is more likely to be characterized by asymmetry
and individual and collective actors more often find
themselves in positions of vulnerability. Conditions may
be temporally related. Past dignity encounters help to
establish the conditions for present and future encoun-
ters. An actor whose dignity has been violated in previous
encounters is more likely to be in a position of vulnerabil-
ity in a new encounter, for example. The conditions
described should be conceptualized as risk factors for dig-
nity violation or promotion: their presence does not fully
determine violation or promotion, but makes such out-
comes more likely.
Dignity Violation
In a dignity encounter, individual or collective actors
engage in a cyclical interaction that involves reading each
other's physical and social markers (e.g., age, dress), mak-
ing gestures that signal the underlying tenor of the inter-
action (e.g., smiling, avoiding eye contact), interpreting
and then responding to these markers and gestures
through social processes constituted by word or deed. It is
such social processes that violate dignity. Analysis of par-
ticipants' accounts found that the main social processes
involved in their experiences of violation were:
￿ Rudeness: Being gratuitously nasty or showing general-
ized disrespect.
￿  Indifference: Demonstrating a lack of consideration,
heed, or care.
￿ Condescension: "Talking down to" someone or speaking
to an adult "like a child."
￿ Dismissal: Ignoring or discounting an actor's knowledge,
skills, perceptions, concerns, needs, and feelings.
￿ Diminishment: Making an actor feel smaller or lessened
by the form and content of the interaction.
￿ Disregard: Rendering an actor invisible or voiceless.
Conditions of the dignity dimension of an interaction Figure 1
Conditions of the dignity dimension of an interaction.BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/3
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￿ Contempt: Treating an actor in a way that suggests he or
she has no value.
￿  Dependence: Being forced to rely on others for basic
needs.
￿ Intrusion: Transgressing an actor's bodily or personal
boundaries.
￿ Objectification: Treating an actor like a thing, not a per-
son.
￿ Restriction: Limiting an actor's ability to direct his or her
own life.
￿ Trickery: Taunting, lying, or manipulating for material
gain or psychological advantage.
￿ Grouping: Seeing an actor not as a unique individual, but
only as a member of a collective.
￿ Labeling: Tagging an actor with a descriptive term that
carries a connotation of moral deficiency or social inferi-
ority.
￿ Vilification: Making an actor appear threatening or dan-
gerous.
￿ Suspicion: Distrusting or treating an actor as though he or
she has committed bad acts.
￿  Discrimination: Treating an actor poorly based on
achieved or ascribed status or apparent membership in a
low-status group.
￿ Exploitation: Using an actor or viewing him or her only
as a means to an end.
￿ Exclusion: Making an actor feel unwelcome in or left out
of physical or social settings.
￿ Revulsion: Treating an actor as though he or she is dis-
gusting or tainted.
￿ Deprivation: Lacking absolute or relative access to the
necessities of life.
￿ Bullying: Threatening or intimidating an actor.
￿ Assault: Using physical force to damage or demean an
actor's body and the spirit.
￿ Abjection: Forcing an actor to humble him or herself by
compromising closely held beliefs or by forced associa-
tion with material or practices considered unclean.
These processes exhibit a number of properties, including
temporal properties like duration or frequency; properties
of scope, like whether they involve individual or collective
actors; properties of visibility, like whether they can be
attributed to named actors or whether the actors are anon-
ymous; and properties of intentionality, like whether they
are acts of omission or commission. They occur at the
micro, meso, and macro levels. For example, a process like
deprivation may describe both a child's experience of
receiving her siblings' skimpy hand-me-downs and a gov-
ernment's habitual failure to provide adequate health and
social services for a segment of its population. Certain
processes of violation seem more likely to occur in some
settings than in others. Closed environments like jails or
family households see some of the more violent proc-
esses, like assault. "Micro insults" or processes like rude-
ness, indifference, and disregard are common in public
places like street corners, stores, and restaurants.
For a social process to become a dignity violation requires
not only the occurrence of word or deed, but also an act
of interpretation. The individual or collective actors
involved in the encounter, including any observers who
might be implicated, must perceive what transpires and
attribute meaning to it. Interpretation itself is a social
process structured by the multiple levels of conditions in
a given dignity encounter. The actor who exists in a posi-
tion of vulnerability, for example, may be more likely to
read a relatively minor social slight as a dignity violation.
In a setting characterized by harsh circumstances, actors
may be so worn down from the constant state of arousal
that any questioning or refusal of cooperation is inter-
preted as an attack on dignity.
Thus far, this analysis has presented the social processes of
violation as distinct and separate mechanisms. In partici-
pants' accounts of violation, however, the social processes
Portrayal of dignity violation Figure 2
Portrayal of dignity violation.BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/3
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of violation tend to cluster. Grouping, labeling, vilifica-
tion, and discrimination often co-occur, for example,
forming social order-level phenomena known as racism,
when directed at individuals or groups of color, or stigma,
when directed at individuals or groups whose identities
have been "spoiled" by a discrediting difference [39,40].
Dignity Promotion
The participants in this study were quick to focus on dig-
nity violation in their lives, but had to be prompted to
think about times when they experienced an enhance-
ment in their dignity. When they did so, however, it
emerged that dignity promotion is a distinct activity–a
kind of work, performed by individual and collective
agents with the aim of promoting either their own dignity
or the dignity of others. This dignity work shares with vio-
lation its embeddedness in interaction and in conditions
pertaining to the actors, the setting, and the social order.
It too is constituted by a number of social processes.
The social processes of dignity work described by partici-
pants as being conducted by individuals or collectives in
order to promote their own dignity are:
￿  Contribution: "Giving something back" to others, as
through volunteering.
￿  Discipline: Performing routine activities like cleaning
and exercising that are seen as responsible and "normal."
￿ Independence: Being self-sufficient.
￿ Accomplishment: "Doing the job right" or completing an
undertaking in a way that meets or exceeds expectations.
￿ Authenticity: "Being myself" or honoring one's own indi-
viduality.
￿ Creativity: Making or sharing art.
￿ Enrichment: Making consumption choices that are seen
as self-improving.
￿ Transcendence: "Rising above" provocation or tempta-
tion.
￿  Restraint: Demonstrating emotional or behavioral
reserve.
￿ Control: Taking charge of a situation.
￿ Perseverance: "Just surviving" in difficult circumstances
or "making the best of it" after a tragedy or severe disap-
pointment.
￿  Preparation: Steeling oneself, as by reducing expecta-
tions, to re-visit settings that have in the past seen viola-
tions of dignity.
￿ Avoidance: Steering clear of associates or activities that
have in the past led to dignity violation.
￿ Concealment: "Covering up" embarrassing markers or sit-
uations.
￿ Resistance: Asserting oneself in the face of threats to dig-
nity.
Participants spoke of the following social processes as dig-
nity work that individuals or collectives perform in order
to promote the dignity of others:
￿ Recognition: Acknowledging the humanity of others by
paying attention and showing appreciation.
￿ Acceptance: Being non-judgmental of difference.
￿ Presence: Keeping others company in difficult situations.
￿ Leveling: Minimizing asymmetry.
￿  Advocacy: Standing up for, or beside, those who are
oppressed.
￿  Empowerment: Working with others to enhance their
capacities, capabilities, and competencies.
￿ Courtesy: Demonstrating common respect.
￿ Love: Honoring and esteeming others.
Depending on the nature of the dignity encounter, these
micro, meso, and macro level social processes become
Portrayal of dignity promotion Figure 3
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ways to create dignity where it is lacking, to maintain dig-
nity that may be fragile, to defend dignity that is under
threat, or to reclaim dignity that has been lost. For exam-
ple, a woman hospitalized with a terminal disease
defends her dignity by attempting to conceal the markers
of her illness, disdaining a hospital gown and putting on
full make-up each day. Health and social care providers
working with homeless individuals describe how they use
processes like presence, advocacy, and empowerment to
help create and maintain dignity for their clients. (Such
uses of dignity promotion also may be instrumental–
helping to keep clients engaged and linked to services.)
Objects of Violation and Promotion
When participants spoke about situations in which their
dignity was violated or promoted, what is it they under-
stood to have been harmed or enhanced? What are the
objects of violation or promotion?
Violation and promotion are experienced as causing
injury or benefit at two levels: the collective and the indi-
vidual. At the collective level, participants described how
the social processes of violation and promotion, even
when enacted in an encounter between individuals, may
also offend or benefit a people (a group or organization
joined by common identification) or humanity in general.
At the individual level, there are two types of harms and
benefits. In the first, people spoke of injuries or benefits to
the self (identity, self respect, self esteem, individuality,
self concept, intelligence, character, self determination,
confidence, a sense of one's self as valuable, worthy, or
good); violations of or respect for the body (bodily integ-
rity); injuries or benefits to moral agency (belief, standards,
or aesthetics); and offenses to or enhancement of person-
hood (humanness). In the second, participants described
how violation and promotion of dignity infringed upon
or served autonomy (privacy, freedom of choice or move-
ment, "adulthood"); status (stature, social standing, role,
reputation, visibility); and citizenship  (the relationship
between an actor and the state). These objects correspond
to human dignity (the people and humanity), dignity-of-self
(the self, the body, moral agency, and personhood), and
dignity-in-relation (autonomy, status, and citizenship).
Many of the social processes of violation and promotion
are linked to specific objects. For example, at the individ-
ual level, aspects of the self are injured by multiple social
processes, including rudeness, contempt, bullying, and
suspicion, and benefited by others, including authenticity
and creativity. The body is violated by intrusion, assault,
deprivation, and revulsion. Moral agency is offended by
trickery and abjection, but may be enhanced through
enrichment and empowerment. Citizenship is degraded
by deprivation, exclusion, restriction, and discrimination,
and may be advanced through contribution, leveling, or
advocacy. Similarly, collective objects like a people may
be harmed through processes like vilification, discrimina-
tion, exclusion, or exploitation, and greater humanity
may be promoted through recognition, acceptance, and
courtesy. (Often participants referenced the golden rule,
noting that when people treat others as they themselves
would wish to be treated the dignity of all is enhanced.)
The Consequences of Dignity Violation
Investigators in the social determinants of health have
begun to theorize about the pathways through which dig-
nity violation may affect health status [12,41,42]. A taxo-
nomic element that will be important to understanding
those pathways, one this paper has not yet discussed, is
that of consequences. Participants used strong language and
vivid examples to speak about the consequences of viola-
tion: Violation begins a "dwindling spiral" of damage and
loss. When a violation occurs, the individual may experi-
ence many emotions, including shock, fear, disbelief,
hurt, mortification or embarrassment, discomfort or pain,
indignation, frustration, or anger. Initial emotions evolve
into a range of longer term experiences of "being
wounded": degradation (feeling "worthless," feeling that
"you don't deserve anything better," feeling "worn down,"
feeling "like a failure," feeling "an inch high" or "like a
criminal"), humiliation (shame and guilt), anger (resent-
ment and hostility), isolation (no sense of belonging, feel-
ing different from everyone else), insecurity (distrust,
dread), disempowerment, and apathy and depression
(feeling "like a cork in the water," lack of belief in or val-
uing anything, feeling suicidal). The individual experi-
ences a series of losses: loss of respect, loss of self worth,
ego, sense of self, and soul, loss of status, social standing,
and moral standing, loss of confidence and determina-
tion. Longer term, the consequences of dignity violation
are understood to be social isolation or marginalization, a
reluctance to seek help or access resources, passivity or
"learned helplessness," a "small" life of constrained
choices, chronically poor physical and mental health, and
a cycle of victimization and abuse, in which the violated
individual turns to violating others. Dignity violation has
similar consequences for collectives and whole societies: a
group "traumatization," resulting in a lack of balance and
the development of a "culture of disrespect" and a subse-
quent loss of collective dignity ("we all feel less human").
In order to expand our understanding of how dignity vio-
lation affects individual and collective health status, it will
be important for future research to describe and classify
these consequences and to link them to specific condi-
tions, social processes, and objects.
Discussion
The taxonomy of dignity presented in this paper has iden-
tified two main forms of dignity–human dignity and
social dignity–and has described and classified several ele-BMC International Health and Human Rights 2009, 9:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/9/3
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ments of these forms, including the social processes that
violate or promote them, the conditions under which
such violations and promotions occur, the objects of vio-
lation and promotion, and the consequences of dignity
violation. The companion grounded theory of dignity to
emerge from this research sets the static components of
the taxonomy in motion, showing how dignity is consti-
tuted through social processes of interaction and interpre-
tation that are structured by conditions pertaining to the
actors involved, their relationships, the settings, and the
broader social order.
Several limitations of this taxonomy should be noted. In
presenting the taxonomy in an abstract and generic form,
context is lost and, with it, the active interplay among spe-
cific social processes and conditions. A more nuanced,
and animated, representation would require thick
description of particular dignity encounters situated in
time and place. Through such close examination, the
explanatory depth of the theory would be enhanced,
although some of its breadth would be lost.
The taxonomy may or may not be exhaustive and univer-
sal in its forms and elements. As noted, there is a long his-
tory of defining and explicating dignity in disciplines like
philosophy and law. The empirically-based taxonomy
described here shows some concordance with the techni-
cal meanings of dignity derived through analysis and
argument in those fields, but also some divergence. It will
be important for future work to subject the taxonomy to
interdisciplinary and cross-cultural comparison, allowing
for the addition or modification of conditions, social
processes, and objects. In some of its emphases, the taxon-
omy certainly reflects particularities of the environment in
which it was developed. For example, the notion of citi-
zenship as an object of violation was very strong in these
data, which may be a reflection of specific historical cir-
cumstances in Toronto: the city is a major center for arriv-
ing immigrants and still feels the effects of a neo-liberal
provincial government that, after being elected in the
mid-1990s, embarked on a series of budget cuts that left
lasting holes in the social safety net and a lasting sense of
betrayal among the populace.
Conclusion
This taxonomy has several implications for work in health
and human rights. It serves as a reminder that dignity per-
tains to both individuals and collective entities and that
there is a connection between the two; that is, threats to
the dignity of one threaten the dignity of all, and vice
versa. Thus, one might expect to see individual and collec-
tive health impacts resulting from injuries to dignity that
are both very broad and very narrow in scope. The mech-
anisms of dignity violation described as part of the taxon-
omy help to elucidate the meso and micro processes
embedded in the macro processes of "structural violence"
that have been the focus of much attention in the health
and human rights movement [43]. Such elucidation can
help to explain the connections between societal condi-
tions and health status in individuals and communities.
In addition to its focus on the health impact of human
rights violation, the health and human rights approach is
concerned with the effects of health policy and health
services on human rights [13]. Analyses that look at dig-
nity in healthcare can use this taxonomy to shed light on
the nature and consequences of dignity violation in these
settings and eventually may provide knowledge that can
be used to develop "dignity screens" for health policy
development, health program planning, and health serv-
ices delivery.
Mann's original call did not focus on dignity promotion.
However, this study, along with other empirical research,
has made it clear that individuals and collectives do act to
create, maintain, defend, and reclaim their own dignity
and that of others, even in the most difficult situations
[1,32,44]. An understanding of dignity work can be
extremely useful to advocates and practitioners in health
and human rights–who are themselves engaged in a kind
of dignity work–allowing them to harness the social proc-
esses and conditions of dignity promotion in order to
improve health and promote the attainment of human
rights goals. This taxonomy can be of value to them in
providing both a map to possible points of intervention
and a language in which to talk about dignity.
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